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 As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s first meeting specifically 
devoted to the legal system, the Fourth Plenum, held in October 2014, attracted a lot of attention 
from those interested in Chinese law. Anyone expecting the official Decision of the Fourth 
Plenum (subsequently referred to as the Decision) to show a Pauline conversion to the ideology 
of rule of law, however, would have been disappointed. Even if the leadership were to desire the 
system of accountability and institutionalized restraint on government that is generally 
understood by the term “rule of law,” it could not be accomplished any time soon and would 
require changes in entrenched features of the current political and administrative system. But 
what about rule by law—a system of largely predictable and rule-governed behavior by lower-
level government administrators, even if those giving the orders are not ultimately accountable or 
constrained? In this essay I will argue that the Fourth Plenum Decision represents modest 
progress toward that goal. 
The big-picture summary is that the Decision contemplates no fundamental reform in the 
relationship between the legal system and the CCP. It is clear that, institutionally speaking, the 
party will remain above the law. At the same time, the Decision does contemplate some 
genuinely meaningful (and in my opinion positive) reforms. It also includes many things that 
might look meaningful but are not.  
This essay will proceed by discussing first the continuing primacy of the CCP. It will then 
analyze in turn some major and then some minor, yet still meaningful, reforms to the legal 
system. It will conclude with a discussion of an important reform that was not made: a reform in 
the system under which local officials administer rules but do not make them. This system 
inevitably results in the highly discretionary application of rules, and makes it difficult—perhaps 
impossible—to develop truly rule-based government. 
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Party First, Law Second 
In general, whenever the party and the law appear in the same sentence in the Decision, the 
party comes first. Certainly, it comes first in some important places. For example, section 1 of 
the decision lists several important principles that must be upheld in order to achieve the goal of 
ruling the state according to law. The first is leadership of the party.  
Section 6 states that judges should be loyal to four things: the party, the state, the people, 
and the law. Notice which comes last. There is no reason, of course, why this sentence could not 
be interpreted as giving all elements equal value; in any list something must come first. But in a 
document like this, nothing—not even a comma—is accidental. The elements of this list come in 
the order they do for a reason. The “Three Supremes” (sange zhi shang), long associated with 
former Supreme People’s Court (SPC) president Wang Shengjun (on whose CV not a single day 
of legal education appears), are resurrected in the same section. Legal system personnel should 
give highest priority to the cause of the party, the interests of the people, and the constitution and 
laws—again, listed in that order. Lawyers must support the party’s leadership, and party cells in 
law firms should step up their activities. 
In addition, obedience of officials to law is presented throughout as a kind of internal party 
policy goal: this is something that party members should do, and officials will even be scored on 
it (section 7, subsection 3). Those who have a special privilege mentality will be criticized and 
educated (piping jiaoyu), and if necessary removed from office. But because the decision 
contemplates no changes in the relationship between the legal system and the party, the system in 
which powerful officials can override law if they wish remains comfortably in place. The 
decision just wants them to wish to override it less often. 
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Major Meaningful Reforms 
Management of judicial personnel. The decision calls for significant reforms in the system 
of managing judges. It proposes to establish essentially a career civil-service model for the 
judiciary. Junior judges should be selected by provincial-level courts and should start their 
careers in basic-level courts. They will then be promoted to higher-level courts based on their 
ability. The decision does not actually specify who will do the promoting, although it would 
make sense for this power to be in the hands of the provincial-level courts as well. The same 
principle applies to procurators. 
This reform is significant precisely because courts are still making their way out of the 
work-unit (danwei) model. The main (or at least, an important) way to become a senior judge at 
a high-level court is to start out as a junior judge at a high-level court—presumably by 
graduating with excellent grades from a famous law school. The Decision endorses the 
desirability of having senior and experienced people from outside the judiciary move laterally 
into it, similar to how experienced lawyers cap off their career with a federal judgeship in the 
United States. Yet while there is much to be said for this idea, the Decision provides no detail as 
to how current procedures might be changed to enhance protections and no steps to my 
knowledge have yet been taken. 
Reforms to the court system. The Decision calls for two significant reforms in the court 
system, both apparently designed to address the problem of local protectionism. First, the SPC is 
to establish “circuit tribunals” (xunhui fating) each with jurisdiction over several provinces, to try 
cases involving more than one province. Note that this proposal does not involve setting up 
another layer of courts; rather, the decisions of such tribunals are decisions of the SPC itself. 
Second, there is a proposal to establish another layer of courts that will cross jurisdictional 
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boundaries. Such a proposal, however, would require legislative and possibly constitutional 
amendments. The Decision gives only a sentence to this proposal, so we know basically nothing 
about how it might be carried out. 
In both cases, the institutions involved are intended to hear only a particular kind of case: 
cross-jurisdictional cases. They do not appear intended to solve the general problem caused by 
the dependence of courts on political power at the same administrative level. The first reform 
affects only the SPC, does not change its jurisdiction, and was apparently sold to the central 
leadership on the theory that if the SPC had seats outside of Beijing, fewer SPC petitioners 
would head to Beijing. The second reform is intended only to reduce the incentives of non-
judicial officials to interfere in cases, but does not affect their ability to do so should they so wish.  
Minor Meaningful Reforms 
The Fourth Plenum decision also proposes reforms that, while perhaps not major or 
groundbreaking, are nevertheless meaningful. 
First, the decision calls for breaking the link between amounts received by a government 
agency in fines and confiscations and that agency’s (or, presumably, its officials’) interests. The 
old policy not only promotes excessive fines and confiscations, but it also gives enforcement 
agencies a stake in continued lawbreaking by those they regulate.  
Second, the decision calls for control over the personnel and finances of state auditing 
organs to be centralized up to the provincial level. This is presumably to provide auditing bodies 
with more independence from local officials, who might pressure them to look the other way 
during their investigations. 
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Third, the decision contains some welcome language on civil rights. It specifies the 
principle of the presumption of innocence (yi zui cong wu).1 It also endorses the principle of 
exclusion of unlawfully gathered evidence. I put both these items in the “meaningful but minor” 
category because while they are not meaningless and could be important, there have been similar 
measures before and problems still persist. 
Fourth, the decision rather surprisingly seems to endorse an Anglo-American-type jury. At 
present, China has a system of “people’s assessors” (renmin peishenyuan): lay people who in 
certain cases sit alongside judges and have (in theory, although of course not in practice) 
equivalent decision-making power over the case by taking a vote at the end. The Fourth Plenum 
decision calls for the gradual implementation of a system whereby assessors will decide only 
issues of fact and not issues of law. I group this with the minor reforms because, although it 
would be major if actually implemented, I am not confident that it will get very far. 
Feel-Good Language 
The Decision calls for strengthening or increasing many things that already exist—from 
constraining state power to increasing legal aid. Consider, for example, that jiaqiang (strengthen) 
appears 61 times, jianquan (strengthen) appears 47 times, wanshan (perfect) appears 79 times, 
and tigao (raise or increase) appears 19 times. Promises and declarations of intention are largely 
meaningless, however, without specific institutional reforms. This section highlights a few 
examples. 
Constitutional review. The decision calls for strengthening the system of constitutional 
review of legislation. There is such a system in place now, but it appears to be utterly 
                                                          
1 This phrase literally translates as “when there is doubt about the crime, err on the side of finding no crime.” 
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nonfunctional. The decision does not propose a fundamentally different way of ensuring that 
legislation and government actions conform to the constitution. It essentially calls for 
maintaining the current system of potential top-down review but doing it better. 
Interference with court cases. The decision denounces attempts by leading officials to 
interfere with court cases and calls for the establishment of a system for keeping track of such 
attempts. In March 2014 the Central Political-Legal Committee (a party body) issued rules to 
implement such a system. But the same system of incentives that now makes judges responsive 
to such attempts is going to make them reluctant to record and report them. Given what we know 
about how China operates now, it is fair to wait for strong evidence before believing this reform 
has taken hold and powerful officials are no longer able to interfere in cases that interest them.  
Dogs That Did Not Bark 
Curiously unmentioned in the Decision is an important reform mooted at last year’s Third 
Plenum: the centralization up to the provincial level of court finances and personnel 
appointments. This reform, designed to counter local protectionism, is apparently already being 
tried out on a pilot basis in Shanghai and perhaps other places. Though popular among legal 
academics, the measure is controversial among judges for at least two reasons. First, judges fear 
that a more hierarchical system of authority will increase the power of court leaders over them. 
Second, judges in prosperous areas fear that putting court finances under a higher administrative 
authority (i.e., the province) will mean a unified salary scale for all judges under that authority. 
Judges in poor areas might receive higher pay, but judges in rich areas could receive less. The 
absence of language on this issue may well be evidence that this reform has stalled.  
A welcome absence in the decision is language downplaying legal professionalism and 
touting closeness to the masses, a discourse that has in recent years become more prominent. The 
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absence of populist language fits well into a professionalization model but not very well into the 
story of deprofessionalization, populism, and China turning against law.2 In addition, it suggests 
a greater role for court decisions as sources of legal authority and not just as one-off judgments 
between two disputing parties. If a court decision is merely a one-off judgment unrelated to 
anything else the legal system does, then it does not much matter if untrained lay people decide 
legal questions as well as factual ones. But if a court decision constitutes legal authority to any 
degree, then it is important to control who is making that decision and how he or she makes it. 
Professionalization of the judiciary makes it more possible for court decisions to have 
precedential value.  
Finally, perhaps the most important dog that did not bark is the Fourth Plenum’s failure to 
propose reforms to a long-standing feature of China’s legal-administrative system that is a major 
obstacle to the establishment of rule-based government, whether rule by law or the more exalted 
rule of law: the centralization of rule-making power coupled with the decentralization of 
administrative power.3 In other words, rules are made at the provincial and central levels, in 
which the bureaucracies tend to be woefully understaffed and do not deliver government services 
directly to the public. That task falls to local governments, which have limited rule-making 
power. Thus, rule-making is in hands of those who know little about problems of implementation. 
As a result, the rules tend to be vague and leave great room for variation in local implementation. 
                                                          
2 For work on this story of deprofessionalization, populism, and China turning against law (with which I generally 
agree), see Carl Minzner, “China’s Turn against Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 59, no. 935 (2011); 
and Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in Mao's Invisible 
Hand, ed. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 165–
200. 
3 The author owes much for the argument presented here to recent works by Wei Cui of the University of British 
Columbia Faculty of Law. See, in particular, Wei Cui, “Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance: A 
Transactional Cost Perspective,” University of Toronto Law Journal (forthcoming); and Wei Cui, “What Is 
Federalism, Chinese Style? A Perspective from the Law,” in The Beijing Consensus? How China Has Changed 
the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development and Global Legal Practices, ed. Weitseng Chen, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
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This variation often comes down to the discretionary decisions of local officials and to that 
extent ceases to be law-like.  
The implications of this feature of China’s legal-administrative system for the rule of law 
are broad. Consider how the norms of securities or tax law, for example, are enforced in the 
United States. A great deal of reliance is placed on voluntary compliance by regulated parties, 
coupled with occasional audits and other after-the-fact means of detecting and punishing 
noncompliance. But since taxpayers and issuers cannot possibly know all the applicable laws, 
they rely on assistance from their lawyers. The government has cleverly managed to make the 
private sector pay for its own compliance efforts and, by and large, secures a high level of 
compliance. 
But for this system to work there must be law for lawyers to become expert in. In other 
words, there must be a reasonably predictable and unified system of rules. Ad hoc, discretionary 
decisions by government officials cannot supply this kind of legal environment. Thus, regardless 
of what we think of ad hoc decision-making from a fairness perspective, it renders impossible a 
certain mode of governance that has the advantage, among others, of being much cheaper. 
Moreover, this system of ad hoc decision-making cannot be changed simply by central 
government decree. It is an artifact of administrative decentralization—a feature of China’s 
governance with roots that are deep and long-standing.  
In short, some of the fundamental obstacles to rule by law, to say nothing of rule of law, 
exist in the everyday practice of government regulation, long before any disputes reach the 
courts, and may well swamp whatever salutary effects are obtained by reforms to the system of 
courts and judges. 
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In conclusion, the Decision of the Fourth Plenum offers some modest progress toward the 
CCP’s rule-by-law project, including reforms in the way judges are selected and promoted. It 
does not, however—and is not intended to—promote external accountability for the party and its 
officials.  
 
 
